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The debt crisis and austerity policies are hitting the societies of Europe’s 
Mediterranean periphery, particularly Portugal, Greece, and Spain, hard. 
With the onset of the economic crisis, a whole growth and development 
model based on low wages and property speculation has come crashing 
to the ground. But in addition, as a result of the adjustment measures 
implemented, the entire social model and the system of social rights won 
in previous decades have entered into crisis. The austerity measures affect 
welfare states that are particularly fragile compared with the European 
Union average. The Mediterranean countries, especially Portugal, Greece, 
and Spain, developed weak welfare states in comparison with the Euro-
pean Union as a whole. These countries established their welfare regimes 
later, in the 1970s, in an international context in which neoliberal poli-
cies were already gaining the upper hand as Keynesian policies were being 
abandoned (Rodríguez Cabrero 2004; Adelantado 2000). This does not 
mean, of course, that on a world-comparative scale the workers in Medi-
terranean Europe did not achieve a standard of social rights unheard of on 
other continents. But the future of these rights is now under threat from 
the austerity bulldozer.
Debt Crisis and Political Crisis
If during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s we saw the impact of foreign debt 
crisis on the people of the South through the systematic application of 
programs of structural adjustment and social cuts that were claimed to be 
necessary in order to deal with the payment of the debt, today it is the 
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Mediterranean periphery of Europe that is caught up in the whirlwind of 
the debt crisis.
As part of the socialization of banking debts, in the European Union 
(EU) as a whole, 1.7 trillion euros were allocated to rescuing private bank-
ing during the early period of the crisis (CADTM 2010). This aggravated 
the situation of public accounts, placing the countries of the European 
periphery in the eye of the hurricane and intensifying attacks on social 
rights and their reduction to a subaltern status within the EU. The very 
nature of the EU has made it particularly vulnerable to the crisis. First, 
monetary union and the creation of the eurozone were affected on the 
basis of heterogeneous economies with uneven productivity levels and no 
intention of correcting these divergences. Even before the outbreak of the 
crisis, these imbalances were clearly visible as the disparities between the 
growth rates of the different member states increased still further (Hus-
son 2010). Prior to the onset of the crisis, the differences between the 
EU countries in terms of productive structure and position in the interna-
tional economy led to a marked contrast between, on the one hand, a core 
of competitive countries, such as Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria, 
that built up balance of trade surpluses and, on the other, a group of less 
competitive countries with balance of trade deficits, such as the so-called 
PIGS (Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain) (Medialdea 2010). The euro has 
acted as an instrument limiting wages and public expenditure, depriving 
the countries with lower productivity levels of the room for maneuver 
allowed by currency devaluation. It has been used by Germany, with its 
strength in technology and productivity, to become the eurozone’s leading 
export power. 
Second, the EU lacks the democratic mechanisms for making deci-
sions on a continental scale. Its institutional architecture is a combination 
of an interstate logic, through unequal negotiations between its member 
states, and a suprastate logic, through the operation of the European insti-
tutions headed by the European Commission, control of which depends, 
in the last instance, on negotiations between the member states. The only 
European institution elected on the basis of representative-democratic 
mechanisms, the European Parliament, lacks any real power and is not at 
the center of the EU’s policy deliberation and policy-making process. This 
institutional architecture has proved to be extremely functional as far as 
the interests of the big business organizations and their pressure groups 
are concerned, as they have generally found the corridors of Brussels, far 
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removed from public scrutiny, highly conducive to their lobbying (Bal-
anyá et al. 2002). 
The combination of what is generally called Europe’s “democratic defi-
cit” and neoliberal and monetarist policies led in the 1990s and 2000s to 
a gradual crisis of legitimacy of the European integration project (Pedrol 
and Pisarello 2005). The foremost expression of this was the failure of 
what was commonly referred to as the “European Constitution” (whose 
official title was Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe) follow-
ing the “no” result in the French referendum on May 29, 2005, with 55 
percent of voters rejecting the treaty, thus leaving its future on hold. 
Strangely enough, the EU project’s legitimacy crisis was less pronounced 
in the Mediterranean periphery, in countries such as Portugal, Greece, and 
Spain, where, until the outbreak of the current economic crisis, the ruling 
classes succeeded in associating the EU with “modernity” and “progress” 
as opposed to the international isolation and backwardness these coun-
tries had experienced during the military dictatorships in the second half 
of the twentieth century. 
With the explosion of the current crisis the imbalances at the root of 
the neoliberal European project have intensified, exacerbating tensions 
within this project and reinforcing the hierarchical center-periphery 
relationships. The unstable equilibrium prior to the crisis exploded. The 
“financial coups” in Greece and Italy at the end of 2011, with the appoint-
ment, following pressure from international financial institutions and 
European authorities, of the governments led by, respectively, Papademos 
and Monti—both figures coming from the financial world and linked to 
Brussels—are the clearest example of a logic in which the core states and 
commanding bodies of the European Union act de facto as a “neocolonial 
power” with its own periphery. This way the EU “appears as what it is: a 
deadly menace to the most elementary democratic rules, even the liberal 
parliamentary system” (Kouvelakis 2011). 
Since the onset of the crisis, political life in the periphery of Europe 
has become increasingly and ever more clearly dependent on and subor-
dinate to the Troika—the European Commission, the European Central 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—and the policy of the 
German government. Greece and Portugal have endured official “bail-
outs” with extremely strict economic strings attached. Delegations of the 
Troika, popularly known as the Men in Black, regularly visit both coun-
tries to oversee compliance with these conditions (Camargo 2013)—a 
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scenario reminiscent, albeit in a different institutional context, of the 
structural adjustment plans implemented in Latin America in the 1980s 
and 1990s under the aegis of the IMF. In Spain, the central government’s 
entire policy since 2010, first under Rodríguez Zapatero and then Rajoy, 
has been geared toward complying with the Troika’s and Germany’s “sug-
gestions.” Although the country has not received a formal bailout and so 
has not been subjected to such direct oversight by the Troika, but rather a 
more indirect and less visible process, a one-hundred-billion euro rescue 
package restricted to the banking system was put in place in June 2013 fol-
lowing the collapse of Bankia. The risk premium has been used through-
out this period as a tool of permanent blackmail to justify the need for a 
never-ending adjustment policy.
The economic crisis becomes a political crisis in which democratic-
institutional mechanisms and traditional party systems implode, within 
the framework of an oligarchic and de-democratizing involution of liberal 
parliamentary systems. The direct takeover of command by the financial 
powers since the crisis broke out, putting leading figures (mostly men) 
from the finance and banking sector at the head of governments and key 
ministries, is a very clear sign of this. The proliferation of former directors 
of Goldman Sachs in central political positions in various EU countries 
exemplifies this tendency. Nor should it be forgotten that Spain’s current 
minister for the economy and competitiveness, Luis de Guindos, is a for-
mer president of Lehman Brothers for Spain and Portugal. It is possible to 
say, following Jacques Rancière (2006), that parliamentary democracies 
have become “oligarchic rule-of-law states.” A professionalized minority 
subordinate to the economic power elites monopolizes political repre-
sentation and excludes the majority de facto from real decision making, 
although it continues to draw its formal legitimacy from the majority via 
universal suffrage and electoral victories.
We are moving toward a model of “isonomic oligarchy,” that is, a type 
of regime in which there is no absolute suppression of rights and freedoms 
but rather a marginalization and reduction of them, preserving “mixed 
regimes in which oligarchic and democratic elements coexist, but in which 
the latter occupy a marginal role” (Pisarello 2011a, 185). A concrete exam-
ple of de-democratization in action is the amendment to the Spanish Con-
stitution rushed through parliament by the two main political parties, the 
Spanish Socialist Workers Party and the Popular Party, in August and Sep-
tember 2011. The amendment to Article 135 introduced the concept of a 
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balanced budget and established payment of the debt and interest as the 
absolute priority. This amendment, put forward on August 23 at the height 
of the summer holiday season, was fast-tracked through a few weeks later 
by the two major parties in the Spanish parliament, the Congress of Depu-
ties, without even putting the proposed amendment to the constitution 
to a referendum. In this way one of the precepts of neoliberalism and aus-
terity policies was built into the constitution following a scheme “aiming 
to enshrine in rules of the highest juridical rank—treaties, constitutions, 
organic laws—an ideological model that is so closed that it excludes alter-
native models, thereby distorting the scope of the democratic principle” 
(Pisarello 2011b).
Austerity and the Gender Debt
The sovereign debt crisis and the rising public debt are used by creditors, 
as well as by governments and institutions, as an argument for applying 
measures of adjustment: the reduction of public expenditure, privatiza-
tion, cuts in social services, the erosion of labor rights, and so on, with the 
consequent transfer of the cost of the crisis to the ordinary people (Tous-
saint 2012). Austerity affects the working and middle classes and implies 
a loss of social and labor rights for a large part of society. The economic 
crisis and adjustment policies affect in particular ways some specific social 
groups based on gender, age, or ethnicity. For example, one of the most 
striking and often analyzed effects of the crisis is the rise in mass unem-
ployment among youth ( Juventud Sin Futuro 2011).
Here we will use the case of Spain to provide some analysis of the spe-
cific effects of austerity, which is not gender neutral, for women. There is 
a specific gender dimension to the loss of rights and increasing inequality 
brought about by austerity policies. Cuts to social benefits and the priva-
tization of public services hit women directly and specifically as a result of 
the specific role women play in society, in the family, and inside the labor 
market because of the sexual division of labor. 
First, cuts specifically affect policies on equality. In Spain, for example, 
budgets affecting equality have been cut by 42 percent since the onset of 
the crisis, resulting in the shutting down of equal opportunity programs 
and a reduction by 28.5 percent in services providing aid and assistance 
to women experiencing domestic violence. That means, for example, 
that agents for equal opportunities (in charge of implementing equality 
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policies) were fired; specific aid services to women affected by domestic 
violence such as local information services, emergency centers, and shel-
ters were closed down; and programs to promote equality at work were 
removed. These measures not only do away with policies necessary for 
equality between men and women but also, as the Gender Committee of 
the Citizen Debt Audit Platform points out, convey the idea that policies 
on equality are “superfluous policies that can only be afforded in times of 
economic prosperity”(Comisión de género de la PACD 2013a).
Second, the cuts in social expenditure, which mostly take the form of 
eliminating jobs and lowering wages, are concentrated in highly feminized 
sectors such as health and education. For instance, in 2012 women were 
54.3 percent of the public sector workforce, while they represent only 45.3 
percent of the total workforce (Ezquerra, 2012a). But between the second 
quarter of 2012 and the same period in 2013, 67 percent of jobs lost in 
the public sector affected women, that is, 133,400 out of 197,900 (CCOO 
2013). At the same time, steps such as freezing pensions and lengthening 
the contribution period on which pension entitlement is based also have 
negative consequences for women, for the following reasons: (1) women’s 
greater presence in the informal economy, which is estimated to represent 
around 20 percent of Spanish GDP ( Jiménez Fernández and Martínez-
Pardo del Valle 2013); (2) their greater presence in part-time work, as 75 
percent of part-time workers are women; and (3) their generally intermit-
tent employment record as a result of caring for others, so that in turn they 
face more objective difficulties in building up the minimum contributions 
required (Ezquerra 2011). 
Third, cuts in basic social services such as for health care, education, 
and child care centers, lead to their provision, cost, and responsibilities 
being transferred to unpaid care work. Studies show that care and domes-
tic labor is distributed unevenly among women and men: according to the 
2009–10 Survey of Time Uses, by the Spanish National Statistics Insti-
tute (INE in its Spanish acronym), women spend an average of two and a 
quarter hours daily more than men in domestic and care work, although 
the historical tendency is a progressive reduction of this gap (INE 2011). 
Social cuts in this scenario mean that whatever the state’s social services 
stop doing is passed directly mostly on to women as wives, mothers, and 
daughters. Unremunerated work tends to adapt to the economic situation 
in a countercyclical fashion: the more stable the economy, the more for-
merly unpaid work becomes waged work, whereas in a crisis, it is squeezed 
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out of the labor market and reverts to being unpaid. This means that even 
if income decreases because of unemployment, family welfare deterio-
rates to a lesser extent at the expense of an increase in the unremunerated 
housework and care work performed by women (Larrañaga 2009). The 
response to the crisis consists, therefore, in transferring a large part of the 
workload to the family sphere, which means basically women. A quite vis-
ible and widely observed example of this dynamic has been cuts in the 
budget allocation for implementing the Dependency Law (which funds 
services required by dependent people). The National Reforms Plan 2013, 
announced in May 2013, included a trimming of 1.1 billion euros, which 
in practice represents the near derogation of this law, reduced to an empty 
shell with paltry funding. The reduction in state-provided allowances for 
those looking after dependent people has a threefold consequence: job 
losses in the highly feminized care sector; deterioration of everyday life for 
dependent people; and workload transfer mostly to women, in their roles 
as mothers and wives, to take care of dependent relatives.
Odious Debt, Illegitimate Debt, Audits, and “Debtocracy”
The repudiation of debt by those who suffer its consequences has been a 
constant throughout history.1 The doctrine of odious debt, which under 
international law is used to demand the nonpayment of a debt contracted 
by a government and used against its people, has been put forward and 
applied for the nonpayment of debts incurred throughout the nineteenth, 
twentieth, and twenty-first centuries (Toussaint and Millet 2010).
As the main proponent of the doctrine, the legal theorist Alexander 
Sack defined “odious debt” in 1927: “When a despotic power contracts 
a debt, not for the needs or in the interests of the state, but rather to 
strengthen its despotic regime, to suppress a popular insurrection, etc, this 
debt is odious for the people of the entire state. . . . This debt does not bind 
the nation; it is a debt of the regime, a personal debt contracted by the 
ruler, and consequently it falls with the demise of the regime” (CADTM 
2008). This doctrine has been applied or invoked at different moments in 
history. In 1898, the United States used it to avoid paying the debt that the 
Spanish state claimed from it over Cuba, one of Spain’s former colonies, 
which then became a U.S. protectorate. At the Paris Peace Conference, the 
United States argued that the Cuban debt was odious because it had been 
used to suppress popular uprisings, the people had not consented, and the 
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creditors were aware of this and therefore of the risk of nonpayment. The 
argument was accepted and the debt was canceled. In 1919, the Treaty 
of Versailles cleared Poland from paying part of the debt contracted by 
the German and Prussian governments for their colonization and its use 
against its people. And we could cite other examples (Toussaint and Millet 
2010).
More recently, the United States wielded this doctrine to avoid accept-
ing responsibility for debts acquired by the government of Iraq when that 
country came under U.S. administration in 2003. However, the United 
States finally renounced the odious debt argument, aware as it was of the 
precedent that could be established, and the debt relief was finally carried 
out citing reasons of “sustainability” (CADTM 2008). 
Organizations that have mobilized against foreign debt, such as the 
Jubilee South network and the Belgium-based international network, the 
Committee for the Abolition of Third World Debt (CADTM in its French 
acronym), have led campaigns and initiatives to expose the illegality, usury, 
and illegitimacy of the debt and consequently to encourage its nonpay-
ment. Audits have been one of the main instruments used for this purpose. 
Carrying out an audit of debts makes it possible to investigate why the 
debts were contracted, what they were used for, and who benefited, and to 
expose irregularities in their contracting, to reveal the complicity of their 
creditors and to obtain the legal foundations for their repudiation.
By the middle and end of the 2000s, these initiatives became wide-
spread in the countries of the South, especially in Latin America, impelled 
by organizations, social movements, and some others with the involve-
ment of their governments. In part they were the culmination of a long 
process of social mobilization throughout the previous decade in favor 
of canceling the foreign debt of the countries of the South, both in the 
affected countries and in the countries of the North, under the impulse of 
the Jubilee 2000 and Jubilee South campaigns (Vivas 2007). 
Perhaps the best-known case is that of Ecuador. The debt audit carried 
out in this country was the most important experience of this kind, as it 
included the active involvement of the government, academics, and local 
and international social organizations and led to the political decision not 
to pay part of the debt. In 2007 the Public Credit Integral Audit Commis-
sion, comprising representatives of the Ecuadorian government and social 
organizations from Ecuador and other countries, was set up to identify 
Ecuador’s illegitimate debt by means of an exhaustive examination of the 
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debt incurred with multilateral creditors, though also including commer-
cial loans, bilateral loans, and bonds. The audit’s final report, presented in 
September 2008, concluded that a large part of the debt was illegitimate. 
As a result, the government declared a moratorium on the payment of 
part of the private debt and made a counteroffer to pay 30 percent of its 
value. In this way the Ecuadorian government saved some 2.2 billion dol-
lars, plus 6 billion dollars of interest, which it allocated to social resources 
(Piñero, Chantry, and Fresnillo 2011). 
Now, in the context of the foreign debt crisis and the use of debt as a 
justification for policies of structural adjustment, the question of the yoke 
of debt has become a central aspect of the movement against the policies 
of austerity imposed in Mediterranean Europe. The debt issue has been 
incorporated in two ways by the movement against austerity, and these 
feed back on each other. On the one hand, it appears as a cross-issue in 
specific struggles against cuts (in health, education, etc.) and the imposi-
tions of the Troika. In terms of the movement, the debt then becomes the 
keystone and the unifying element for explaining the mechanism for trans-
ferring the costs of the crisis to the bulk of the population and its export to 
the European periphery. The repudiation of the debt thus becomes a uni-
fying thread, a reference framework, for the rejection of each specific and 
concrete austerity measure. This refusal is expressed, for example, by the 
slogan “We Owe Nothing, We’ll Sell Nothing, We’ll Pay Nothing” used in 
Greece by the Squares movement (as the indignant and occupier move-
ment was dubbed in that country) in June 2011.
On the other hand, as well as including the rejection of debt in the 
demonstrations against cuts, specific campaigns have emerged against 
debt itself. These campaigns have launched initiatives based on public 
auditing, following the Latin American example of the previous decade. 
As has already been noted, the audit is conceived as a pedagogical tool 
allowing ordinary people to understand the functioning of the state, the 
economy, and institutional relationships in order to equip them with argu-
ments and reasons for combating austerity. As well as referring to the pre-
viously mentioned odious debt doctrine, the citizen debt audit movement 
has introduced another key idea: illegitimate debt. In other words, the 
audit is conceived as an instrument to distinguish the portion of the debt 
that may be regarded as legitimate from that which is not. 
The concept of illegitimate debt goes beyond that of odious debt, 
which is recognized in international law, and serves to denote, for example, 
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debts contracted as a result of bank bailouts, the construction of unneces-
sarily huge and environmentally destructive infrastructures, subsidies to 
private companies that mistreat their workers, and so on. The concepts 
of “legitimate” and “illegitimate” debt are not static or formally defined, 
however. They are politically constructed and in dispute. What is eventu-
ally going to be considered an illegitimate debt that shouldn’t be paid, as 
the result of an audit, will depend on the balance of forces between the 
political and social actors of a given country.
Debt audit processes can have a dynamic that is, as pointed out by 
some authors, somewhat analogous to the classic claim made by the labor 
movement for workers’ control, but with important differences resulting 
from the change in context and the phase that neoliberal capitalism is cur-
rently in. The ultimate goal of workers’ control was based on control in the 
workplace (the factory, the company, and so on) with the expectation of 
extending it to the whole of society and the state, in a bottom-up dynamic. 
In the case of the audit, the reverse is true. It begins by controlling the 
practices of the state and of its debt so as to extend this experience, from 
the top downward, to all work centers in production and in all the places 
where there is exploitation and oppression, including the service and pub-
lic sectors (Mitralias 2011).
The first campaign in Mediterranean Europe to promote a public debt 
audit was launched in Greece, the European country most affected by the 
sovereign debt crisis. In late 2010 and early 2011, faced with the impasse 
in which the country found itself, the Greek Auditing Commission of 
the Public Debt, made up of social organizations, political parties, trade 
unions, and academics, was established with the aim of promoting a public 
debate and popular participation in the decisions made about the debt. 
The aim was to question the stance adopted by the government and the 
international community with regard to this debt. The commission sought 
to bring the debt contracts (some of which were made with the media-
tion of global investment bankers such as Goldman Sachs, and others ear-
marked for financing the purchase of arms, and so on) into the open and 
to put an end to the opacity of their management. An additional aim was 
to spread the idea that the need for repayment of the debt is not something 
so self-evident, but will rather depend on its nature and on whether or not 
it is considered odious or illegal (Lapavitsas 2010).
The Citizens’ Campaign for Auditing the Debt in Spain sprang from 
the “Living in a Debtocracy” (“Viviendo en Deudocracia” in Spanish) con-
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ference, held in Madrid in October 2011, which brought together some 
thirty groups and members of social movements interested in promot-
ing this initiative. Months later, in March 2012, the Platform for Auditing 
the Public Debt: We Don’t Owe, We Won’t Pay was formally constituted, 
devoted to raising awareness of the debt and its central importance in 
understanding the present crisis. It works not as a mass movement but 
rather as an education and awareness platform that spreads a critical view 
about debt and its payment.
Resistance to Austerity from a Gender Perspective
The citizen audit movement has also gradually incorporated a feminist 
perspective that points out the gender dimension of the crisis and the aus-
terity policies justified by the need to pay off the debt. This gender per-
spective is the result of the intersection between the women’s movement 
and the new anti-austerity movements. In Spain the Citizen Audit cam-
paign set up a gender committee, while in Greece a women’s meeting was 
held coinciding with the International Conference on Debt and Austerity 
in Athens in May 2011. All these initiatives have sought to highlight the 
specific impact austerity measures have on women and mark the rebirth, 
albeit limited, of the women’s movement in the framework of resistance to 
austerity. They have also tried to bring an overall gender perspective to the 
analysis of the functioning of capitalism, work, and welfare state policies. 
One of the working documents of the Gender Committee of the Platform 
for the Citizen Audit of Spain’s Debt points out: 
One of these invisible debts is the gender debt, the debt society has 
with regard to women. Women are creditors, in particular, in regard to 
the state and companies, as it is they who perform the care work that 
enables the reproduction of workers. Although many women have 
a double workload, only one part is recognized, whereas the other is 
neither socially acknowledged nor remunerated. As long as we live in a 
capitalist patriarchy, the debt owed to women will not be recognized or, 
of course, paid back. (Comisión de género de la PACD 2013b) 
This feminist anti-austerity movement is faced simultaneously with two 
challenges: achieving specific visibility in this new context and impreg-
nating all the rising social struggles with the gender perspective and its 
demands. 
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The initiatives to provide the debt audit movement with a feminist per-
spective are thus part of a more general attempt by feminist activists to 
endow the struggles against austerity with a gender perspective. In Spain, 
for instance, the origin of such efforts can be traced back to the activity of 
feminist groups during the occupation of the squares in May–June 2011 
when what came to be called the 15M or indignados movement erupted. 
At the beginning, this movement did not have a specific gender dimen-
sion to its slogans, language, or demands, nor did it refer specifically to 
the particular problems faced by women in the crisis. In many of the main 
occupied squares and camps specific feminist working groups were set up, 
such as the Feministas Indignadas in Barcelona and the Gender Commis-
sion in Madrid. They were the result of a linking-up between the preex-
isting feminist movement and a new generation of women activists who 
developed a feminist consciousness. The work of these feminist commit-
tees played a decisive role in gradually introducing a gender perspective 
into the 15M movement in regard to both the impact of the austerity poli-
cies and sexual and reproductive rights. This was no easy task and was not 
without its problems. The gender perspective, in terms of language and 
practice, penetrated deeper into the movement as the movement grew in 
strength and maturity. Nevertheless, the gender perspective entered the 
15M movement in a limited and contradictory way. Some of the most vis-
ible flaws in gender terms (e.g. the use of sexist language in meetings) were 
corrected, but a feminist perspective didn’t truly permeate the movement 
in terms of its conceptualization of social inequalities and definition of pri-
orities and demands. And what advances it made were always the result of 
the ongoing political pedagogy carried out by the feminist working groups 
within the movement (Ezquerra 2012b). 
Conclusion
The combination of including nonpayment of debt among the claims of 
the movements opposed to austerity policies, on the one hand, and spe-
cific campaigns by the public, on the other, has led to the debt issue being 
situated at the center of the resistance to structural adjustment in southern 
Europe, where it is possible to say that democracy has been replaced by 
debtocracy. In other words, what we are seeing in the region is the dictato-
rial government of creditors and their allies, which, in the name of debt 
payment, is rapidly doing away with people’s social, economic, and demo-
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cratic rights—rights established under social democratic regimes for the 
past four decades. 
Behind these dynamics, there is a project, not yet coherent or finished, 
aimed at changing the social model and reorganizing social relationships 
for the benefit of financial capital. For powerful banking interests, the social 
regulations that still exist in the old continent act as an impediment to the 
international competitiveness of the European economy and an annoying 
burden they would like to get rid of. Somehow we are witnessing a logic 
of “Latin Americanization” of the societies of southern Europe in terms of 
inequality, polarization, the deterioration of working conditions, and the 
degrading of public services and political participation.
The current cycle of resistance to austerity is essentially defensive; it is a 
collective reaction to an across-the-board attack against a particular social 
model. But this underlying defensive dynamic contains within it certain 
elements of an offensive nature in that they are disruptive and have the 
capacity to upset the routine functioning of the institutions. Although the 
resistance has so far not been able to achieve a significant number of vic-
tories that would enable it to accumulate enough forces to launch a coun-
terattack, there have been victories. But these victories have been partial, 
very defensive (for example, putting a halt to household evictions in Spain 
thanks to the action of movements like the Mortgage Affected People Plat-
form, or PAH in its Spanish acronym), and still lodged within an overall 
context of the advance of adjustment policies (Antentas and Vivas 2012).
The all-out offensive against social rights and liberties, the intensity of 
structural adjustment, and continued repression may unleash two alter-
native scenarios that are in fact going to be intermingled until one or the 
other definitively wins out. The first would see the austerity policies bull-
doze their way unstoppably ahead, crushing all resistance as they go and 
consolidating an increasingly oligarchical and plutocratic political system 
and a society in which capital reigns unrestrained, trade unions and social 
movements are marginalized, and social inequalities of all kinds continue 
to increase. The second would be for the austerity screw to be turned so 
tightly that the magnitude of the ensuing tragedy produces a boomerang 
effect in society, exacerbating the legitimacy crisis of the political and 
economic institutions and opening up the way for a paradigm shift and a 
change of model in a democratic and egalitarian direction.
In the Mediterranean periphery of Europe, in Greece, Portugal, and 
Spain, what started out as an economic and financial crisis has gradually 
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turned into an extremely serious social crisis and also a growing political 
crisis affecting the legitimacy of the political regimes established in the 
1970s. All major crises have historically been resolved by a reorganization 
of social relations. As Daniel Bensaïd (2010) reminds us, “A way out of the 
crisis leading to the emergence of a new productive order and a new regime 
of accumulation does not depend on the economy alone. It requires new 
balances of forces, new geopolitical relations, new institutional and juridi-
cal devices.” The question is therefore not so much whether we will come 
out of the crisis or not, but how we will come out of it and in which direc-
tion. A crisis is always a turning point in a society’s historical trajectory. It 
is a watershed. But the course society takes from there is not marked out 
in advance; it depends on the balance of forces between social classes and 
social groups. And although at the moment the balance is heavily tilted in 
favor of the financial powers, the endgame still has to be played out.
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Note
 1. Editors’ note: See in this issue “Woman Is an Object Without History,” a 
review of David Graeber’s Debt, by Annie Spencer.
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